Nước Nga "ôn cố tri tân"

Việt Nam hay Trung Quốc có câu: "ôn cố tri tân". Người Anh, Mỹ có câu: "those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it". Hôm nay đọc tin tức lại thấy người Nga làm chuyện đó! Việc làm này chắc chắn là cần thiết và phổ biến trong mỗi dân tộc muốn thành công.

Để kỷ niệm Ngày Đoàn Kết Quốc Gia, Kremlin cho trình chiếu cuốn phim "Thời của những Rối Ren". Cuốn phim này nói về một giai đoạn loạn lạc của nước Nga vào đầu thế kỷ 17 mà nước Nga đã từng bị những nước Thụy Điển, Lithuania, Đức và Ba Lan thống trị trong 15 năm (1598-1613)!

Đạo diễn Vladimir Khotinenko nói với một tờ báo: "Tôi coi thế kỷ 17 là một giai đoạn cực kỳ quan trọng trong lịch sử chúng ta, đơn giản là không có nó, anh sẽ không thể nào hiểu được nước Nga."

Thời kỳ này cũng giống như thời sau khi Liên Xô tan rã, nước Nga bị suy yếu, mất ổn định chính trị bên trong, và họ đã bị các đế quốc phương tây ăn hiếp. Con gấu vĩ đại đột nhiên trở thành một con gấu nhồi bông!

Một đại cường như Nga mà khi có bất ổn chính trị còn bị người ngoài ăn hiếp, huống chi một nước đang phát triển như VN? Và chính VN cũng đã có kinh nghiệm đau thương gấp nhiều lần như vậy!

Mong những nhà lãnh đạo VN luôn sáng suốt để lèo lái con thuyền đất nước. Mong người VN hãy đoàn kết, thương yêu, đùm bọc, lẫn nhau; giúp nhau diệt trừ những bệnh hoạn trong con người VN để cơ thể đất nuớc VN luôn khoẻ mạnh mà tiếp tục phát triển, ăn no chóng lớn!

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Action movie an allegory for Putin's Russia

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071103/lf_nm/russia_film_dc;_ylt=AmjwmWr.69mU8cI4.PekIywUewgF

By Chris Baldwin

MOSCOW (Reuters) - In a film that hit cinema screens this week, patriotic Russians despairing at the lack of a strong leader rise up, throw out their Western overlords and make Russia a proud country once again.

It could be a documentary about how President Vladimir Putin put an end to the turmoil that followed the Soviet Union's collapse. In fact, it is based on a period in the 17th century known as the "Time of Troubles."

But the parallels may be more than a coincidence: the film was commissioned by the Kremlin to mark National Unity Day on Sunday, and the director makes little secret that it is an allegory for modern Russia.

The film is being released a month before Russia votes in a parliamentary election that many observers say is a referendum on Putin's rule, during which he has accumulated huge power and hit back at what he calls Western encroachment.

"I ... consider the 17th century an extremely important period in our history, without which you simply cannot understand Russia," director Vladimir Khotinenko said in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper.

"And now those times are really relevant," he said. "I am talking about the period after Perestroika. We lived in a Time of Troubles. Its duration even coincided with the one in the 17th century."

He added: "I'm convinced -- and I have nothing against democracy -- that Russians have a strong desire for a Tsar."

FIGHT SCENES

The film, called "1612," centers around a ragtag group of Russian peasants who assemble what cannons they can and employ the services of wayward knight to dispatch their Polish occupiers.

It is an action movie, featuring huge battle scenes, sword-fighting in period costume, stunt horse-riding and a siege at a castle. It also has mythical elements: talking fish and a unicorn feature in the story.

At a lavish premiere in Moscow this week, limousines disgorged VIP guests onto a red carpet and two models in white leather outfits handed out glasses of birch-flavored vodka.

The Time of Troubles is the term used in Russia to describe the period starting in 1598, when a ruling family dynasty in what was then known as Muscovy died out.

In the absence of a true royal descendant, Russian peasants fell under the rule of foreign powers, including Swedish, Lithuanian, German and Polish occupiers. That period ended when the Romanov dynasty took over the throne in 1613.

Many Russians see Putin as a leader who brought stability and prosperity to the country after a new Time of Trouble -- the post-Soviet 1990s marked with economic chaos, political turmoil and Western blocs moving closer to Russia's borders.

Critics though say he has sacrificed democracy to achieve stability and has taken on the role of a new Tsar.

The film has an impeccable pro-Kremlin pedigree. It was produced by Nikita Mikhalkov, a director who won the 1994 Best Foreign Language Film Oscar for his "Burnt by the Sun."

Last month he put his name to an open letter asking Putin -- required by the constitution to step down when his second term ends next year -- to stay in office.

The Gazeta.ru Internet news site reported that oil tycoon Viktor Vekselberg pitched in $4 million of his fortune to help finance the film.

He has made a name for himself by using his wealth to buy back Russian cultural treasures -- including a collection of Faberge eggs -- that had been sold abroad.

Vài chi tiết nữa về hoạt động chống Sukarno của CIA

1956, Frank Wisner, Phó Giám Đốc Chương Trình Hành Động của CIA lúc đó, nói: "Tôi nghĩ đã đến lúc chúng ta đè chân Sukarno vào lửa" (nguyên văn: "I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire" ). Tội của ông này là gì? Là vào năm trước đó, ông ta đã tổ chức Hội Nghị Bandung (tên một thành phố ở Indonesia) để tuyên bố lập trường trung lập của khối các nước kém phát triển. Chuyện một khối trung lập cũng không thể chấp nhận được với nhân viên CIA đóng tại Indonesia nên họ đã đề nghị ám sát một nhân vật chính của hội nghị để phá hoại.

Theo điều tra chính thức của một ủy ban Thượng viện Mỹ về vụ này vào năm 1975, lời đề nghị đó đã bị trung ương CIA ở Mỹ bác bỏ thẳng thừng. Nhưng tại sao Thượng viện Mỹ lại mở cuộc điều tra đó? Vì trên thực tế, một chiếc máy bay hành khách trên đường đi dự Hội Nghị Bandung khởi hành từ Hồng Công đã bị rơi xuống biển Đông. Hành khách của chuyến bay đó bao gồm đoàn đại biểu gồm tám người của Trung Quốc, một người Việt Nam, hai nhà báo người Châu Âu. Xin xem chi tiết tiếp theo về vụ này trong phần nguyên bản tiếng Anh phía dưới.

Vào năm 1955, trong cuộc bầu cử quốc hội ở Indonesia, CIA đã chi một triệu USD cho đảng Masjumi, để mong đảng này thắng đảng Quốc Gia của Sukarno và đảng Cộng Sản PKI. Việc này không thành, PKI thắng lớn trong cuộc bầu cử, CIA ở Indonesia báo động Washington về "sự nghiêm trọng" của tình hình Indonesia! Đại sứ Mỹ đang làm việc ở nước này lúc đó là John Allison, không đồng tình với ý kiến này nên đã bị thuyên chuyển. Thay vào đó là Howard Jones, sự lựa chọn này đã làm CIA ở Indonesia vừa lòng.

30/11/1957, Sukarno đã bị ai đó ném nhiều quả lựu đạn khi đang rời một trường học, ông ta thoát hiểm, nhưng 10 người đã bị chết và 48 người khác bị thương. CIA tung tin rằng PKI làm chuyện đó, mặc dù ngay lúc đó họ không biết là ai làm. Xin xem thêm chi tiết câu chuyện này trong phần tiếng Anh.

Để tạo không khí dư luận và hạ uy tín Sukarno chuẩn bị cho cuộc chính biến năm 1958, CIA còn tung tin đồn Sukarno là người thân Liên Xô bất cứ khi nào họ có cơ hội. Những tin đồn này nói rằng Sukarno rất thân mật với một nữ tiếp viên người Nga và luôn đi cùng với cô này ở khắp mọi nơi khi ông ta sang thăm Nga, và chính cô này cũng đã tháp tùng Chủ tịch Kliment Voroshilov sang thăm Indonesia.

Trò bôi nhọ này thành công và câu chuyện này lưu hành như một sự thật chẳng những ở Indonesia mà còn xuất hiện trên báo chí vòng quanh thế giới. Chuyện này trở thành nghiêm trọng đến nỗi một tạp chí nghiêm túc của Anh về tình hình thế giới, tờ Round Table, xếp chuyện Sukarno bị nữ gián điệp Nga nắm cán là một trong những lý do tạo ra cuộc chính biến 1958.

Thừa thắng xông lên, CIA còn định tiến xa hơn nữa trong việc này bằng cách làm một cuộn băng quay cảnh làm tình giữa Sukarno và nữ gián điệp tưởng tượng đó. CIA thuê sở cảnh sát Los Angeles làm chuyện này và cung cấp một mặt nạ của Sukarno cho diễn viên nam đeo vào. Xin xem tiếp chi tiết trong phần tiếng Anh.

Một trong những hành động giúp đỡ trực tiếp của CIA cho phe tường lãnh thân Mỹ trong cuộc chính biến 1958 là cung cấp máy bay ném bom B-26 và phi công Mỹ. Để che đậy hành động của họ, những máy bay đó không mang dấu hiệu, mọi thứ thả ra khỏi máy bay đều có thể chối cãi trách nhiệm được!?

Những phi vụ oanh tạc của những máy bay này đã làm chết rất nhiều thường dân. Và trong một phi vụ như vậy, máy bay của Allen Lawrence Pope, một phi công của CIA, đã bị bắn rơi. Người này đã từng bay 55 phi vụ ở Triều Tiên. Sau đó làm việc hai tháng thả tiếp liệu cho quân Pháp ở Điện Biên Phủ. Lần này sa lưới, phải ở tù và được tha bốn năm sau theo lời yêu cầu của Thượng nghị sĩ Mỹ Robert Kennedy.

Khi bị bắt, phi công này có mang đầy đủ giấy tờ chứng minh mình là phi công của Không Quân Mỹ và hàng không CIA, CAT. Theo qui định, những phi công bay những phi vụ lén lút này sẽ bị kiểm tra và không được mang theo giấy tờ tùy thân lên máy bay để tránh tai tiếng cho Mỹ nếu bị bắt. Nhưng phi công này bằng cách nào đó đã đem giấy tờ theo được để phòng hờ khi bị bắt sẽ không bị giết ngay tại chỗ.

Hơn một tuần sau khi bắn hạ máy bay này, chính quyền Indonesia đã cho công khai sự việc cùng với giấy tờ của phi công này trước báo chí. Trước đó Washington và dư luận Mỹ luôn chối bây bẩy về hoạt động giúp đỡ phe nổi loạn của mình.

Vụ công khai phi công này xảy ra cuối tháng năm, CIA và Mỹ bị lật tẩy trơ mặt nên phải rút lại sự hỗ trợ cho phe nổi loạn nên đến cuối tháng sáu thì chính quyền Sukarno dẹp xong loạn.

Sukarno tiếp tục lãnh đạo bằng cách cân bằng quyền lực giữa PKI và quân đội cho đến năm 1965 thì lại bị đảo chính! Lần này thì CIA và phe thân Mỹ thành công và thiết lập một chế độ độc tài dưới sự lãnh đạo của một Tổng thống là Suharto trong hơn 30 năm sau đó!

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14. INDONESIA 1957-1958

War and pornography

http://members.aol.com/bblum6/indo1.htm

"I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire," said Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (covert operations), one day in autumn 1956.{1} Wisner was speaking of the man who had led Indonesia since its struggle for independence from the Dutch following the war. A few months earlier, in May, Sukarno had made an impassioned speech before the US Congress asking for more understanding of the problems and needs of developing nations like his own.{2}
The ensuing American campaign to unseat the flamboyant leader of the fifth most populous nation in the world was to run the gamut from large-scale military maneuvers to seedy sexual intrigue.
The previous year, Sukarno had organized the Bandung Conference as an answer to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US-created political-military alliance of area states to "contain communism". In the Indonesian city of Bandung, the doctrine of neutralism had been proclaimed as the faith of the underdeveloped world. To the men of the CIA station in Indonesia the conference was heresy, so much so that their thoughts turned toward assassination as a means of sabotaging it.
In 1975, the Senate committee which was investigating the CIA heard testimony that Agency officers stationed in an East Asian country had suggested that an East Asian leader be assassinated "to disrupt an impending Communist [sic] Conference in 1955".{3} (In all likelihood, the leader referred to was either Sukarno or Chou En-lai of China.) But, said the committee, cooler heads prevailed at CIA headquarters in Washington and the suggestion was firmly rejected.
Nevertheless, a plane carrying eight members of the Chinese delegation, a Vietnamese, and two European journalists to the Bandung Conference crashed under mysterious circumstances. The Chinese government claimed that it was an act of sabotage carried out by the US and Taiwan, a misfired effort to murder Chou En-lai. The chartered Air India plane had taken off from Hong Kong on 11 April 1955 and crashed in the South China Sea. Chou En-lai was scheduled to be on another chartered Air India flight a day or two later. The Chinese government, citing what it said were press reports from the Times of India, stated that the crash was caused by two time bombs apparently placed aboard the plane in Hong Kong. A clockwork mechanism was later recovered from the wrecked airliner and the Hong Kong police called it a case of "carefully planned mass murder". Months later, British police in Hong Kong announced that they were seeking a Chinese Nationalist for conspiracy to cause the crash, but that he had fled to Taiwan.{4}
In 1967 a curious little book appeared in India, entitled I Was a CIA Agent in India, by John Discoe Smith, an American. Published by the Communist Party of India, it was based on articles written by Smith for Literaturnaya Gazeta in Moscow after he had defected to the Soviet Union around 1960. Smith, born in Quincy, Mass. in 1926, wrote that he had been a communications technician and code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi in 1955, performing tasks for the CIA as well. One of these tasks was to deliver a package to a Chinese Nationalist which Smith later learned, he claimed, contained the two time bombs used to blow up the Air India plane. The veracity of Smith's account cannot be determined, although his employment at the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1954 to 1959 is confirmed by the State Department Biographic Register.{5}
Elsewhere the Senate committee reported that it had "received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia", and that the planning had proceeded to the point of identifying an agent whom it was believed might be recruited for the job.{6} (The committee noted that at one time, those at the CIA who were concerned with possible assassinations and appropriate methods were known internally as the "Health Alteration Committee".)
To add to the concern of American leaders, Sukarno had made trips to the Soviet Union and China (though to the White House as well), he had purchased arms from Eastern European countries (but only after being turned down by the United States),{7} he had nationalized many private holdings of the Dutch, and, perhaps most disturbing of all, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had made impressive gains electorally and in union-organizing, thus earning an important role in the coalition government.
It was a familiar Third World scenario, and the reaction of Washington policy-makers was equally familiar. Once again, they were unable, or unwilling, to distinguish nationalism from pro-communism, neutralism from wickedness. By any definition of the word, Sukarno was no communist. He was an Indonesian nationalist and a "Sukarnoist" who had crushed the PKI forces in 1948 after the independence struggle had been won.{8} He ran what was largely his own show by granting concessions to both the PKI and the Army, balancing one against the other. As to excluding the PKI, with its more than one million members, from the government, Sukarno declared: "I can't and won't ride a three-legged horse."{9}
To the United States, however, Sukarno's balancing act was too precarious to be left to the vagaries of the Indonesian political process. It mattered not to Washington that the Communist Party was walking the legal, peaceful road, or that there was no particular "crisis" or "chaos" in Indonesia, so favored as an excuse for intervention. Intervention there would be.
It would not be the first. In 1955, during the national election campaign in Indonesia, the CIA had given a million dollars to the Masjumi party, a centrist coalition of Muslim organizations, in a losing bid to thwart Sukarno's Nationalist Party as well as the PKI. According to former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith, the project "provided for complete write-off of the funds, that is, no demand for a detailed accounting of how the funds were spent was required. I could find no clue as to what the Masjumi did with the million dollars."{10}
In 1957, the CIA decided that the situation called for more direct action. It was not difficult to find Indonesian colleagues-in-arms for there already existed a clique of army officers and others who, for personal ambitions and because they disliked the influential position of the PKI, wanted Sukarno out, or at least out of their particular islands. (Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, consisting of some 3,000 islands.)
The military operation the CIA was opting for was of a scale that necessitated significant assistance from the Pentagon, which could be secured for a political action mission only if approved by the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the small group of top NSC officials who acted in the president's name, to protect him and the country by evaluating proposed covert actions and making certain that the CIA did not go off the deep end; known at other times as the 5412 Committee, the 303 Committee, the 40 Committee, or the Operations Advisory Group).
The manner in which the Agency went about obtaining this approval is a textbook example of how the CIA sometimes determines American foreign policy. Joseph Burkholder Smith, who was in charge of the Agency's Indonesian desk in Washington from mid-1956 to early 1958, has described the process in his memoirs: Instead of first proposing the plan to Washington for approval, where "premature mention ... might get it shot down" ...

we began to feed the State and Defense departments intelligence that no one could deny was a useful contribution to understanding Indonesia. When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels' plans to reduce Sukarno's power. This was a method of operation which became the basis of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in the affairs of countries like Chile only after being ordered to do so by ... the Special Group. ... In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the circumstances. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-1958 was one such instance.{11}

When the Communist Party did well again in local elections held in July, the CIA viewed it as "a great help to us in convincing Washington authorities how serious the Indonesian situation was. The only person who did not seem terribly alarmed at the PKI victories was Ambassador Allison. This was all we needed to convince John Foster Dulles finally that he had the wrong man in Indonesia. The wheels began to turn to remove this last stumbling block in the way of our operation."{12} John Allison, wrote Smith, was not a great admirer of the CIA to begin with. And in early 1958, after less than a year in the post, he was replaced as ambassador by Howard Jones, whose selection "pleased" the CIA Indonesia staff.{13} go to notes
On 30 November 1957, several hand grenades were tossed at Sukarno as he was leaving a school. He escaped injury, but 10 people were killed and 48 children injured. The CIA in Indonesia had no idea who was responsible, but it quickly put out the story that the PKI was behind it "at the suggestion of their Soviet contacts in order to make it appear that Sukarno's opponents were wild and desperate men". As it turned out, the culprits were a Muslim group not associated with the PKI or with the Agency's military plotters.{14}
The issue of Sukarno's supposed hand-in-glove relationship with Communists was pushed at every opportunity. The CIA decided to make capital of reports that a good-looking blonde stewardess had been aboard Sukarno's aircraft everywhere he went during his trip in the Soviet Union and that the same woman had come to Indonesia with Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov and had been seen several times in the company of Sukarno. The idea was that Sukarno's well-known womanizing had trapped him in the spell of a Soviet female agent. He had succumbed to Soviet control, CIA reports implied, as a result of her influence or blackmail, or both. "
This formed the foundation of our flights of fancy," wrote Smith. "We had as a matter of fact, considerable success with this theme. It appeared in the press around the world, and when Round Table, the serious British quarterly of international affairs, came to analyze the Indonesian revolt in its March 1958 issue, it listed Sukarno's being blackmailed by a Soviet female spy as one of the reasons that caused the uprising."
Seemingly, the success of this operation inspired CIA officers in Washington to carry the theme one step further. A substantial effort was made to come up with a pornographic film or at least some still photographs that could pass for Sukarno and his Russian girl friend engaged in "his favorite activity". When scrutiny of available porno films (supplied by the Chief of Police of Los Angeles) failed to turn up a couple who could pass for Sukarno (dark and bald) and a beautiful blonde Russian woman, the CIA undertook to produce its own films, "the very films with which the Soviets were blackmailing Sukarno". The Agency developed a full-face mask of the Indonesian leader which was to be sent to Los Angeles where the police were to pay some porno-film actor to wear it during his big scene. This project resulted in at least some photographs, although they apparently were never used.{15}
Another outcome of the blackmail effort was a film produced for the CIA by Robert Maheu, former FBI agent and intimate of Howard Hughes. Maheu's film starred an actor who resembled Sukarno. The ultimate fate of the film, which was entitled "Happy Days", has not been reported.{16}
In other parts of the world, at other times, the CIA has done better in this line of work, having produced sex films of target subjects caught in flagrante delicto who had been lured to Agency safe-houses by female agents.
In 1960, Col. Truman Smith, US Army Ret., writing in Reader's Digest about the KGB, declared: "It is difficult for most of us to appreciate its menace, as its methods are so debased as to be all but beyond the comprehension of any normal person with a sense of right and wrong." One of the KGB methods the good colonel found so debased was the making of sex films to be used as blackmail. "People depraved enough to employ such methods," he wrote, "find nothing distasteful in more violent methods."{17}
Sex could be used at home as well to further the goals of American foreign policy. Under the cover of the US foreign aid program, at that time called the Economic Cooperation Administration, Indonesian policemen were trained and then recruited to provide information on Soviet, Chinese and PKI activities in their country. Some of the men singled out as good prospects for this work were sent to Washington for special training and to be softened up for recruitment. Like Sukarno, reportedly, these police officers invariably had an obsessive desire to sleep with a white woman. Accordingly, during their stay they were taken to Baltimore's shabby sex district to indulge themselves.{18}

The Special Group's approval of the political action mission was forthcoming in November 1957{19}, and the CIA's paramilitary machine was put into gear. In this undertaking, as in others, the Agency enjoyed the advantage of the United States' far-flung military empire. Headquarters for the operation were established in neighboring Singapore, courtesy of the British; training bases set up in the Philippines; airstrips laid out in various parts of the Pacific to prepare for bomber and transport missions; Indonesians, along with Filipinos, Taiwanese, Americans, and other "soldiers of fortune" were assembled in Okinawa and the Philippines along with vast quantities of arms and equipment.
For this, the CIA's most ambitious military operation to date, tens of thousands of rebels were armed, equipped and trained by the US Army. US Navy submarines, patrolling off the coast of Sumatra, the main island, put over-the-beach parties ashore along with supplies and communications equipment. The US Air Force set up a considerable Air Transport force which air-dropped many thousands of weapons deep into Indonesian territory. And a fleet of 15 B-26 bombers was made available for the conflict after being "sanitized" to ensure that they were "non-attributable" and that all airborne equipment was "deniable".
In the early months of 1958, rebellion began to break out in one part of the Indonesian island chain, then another. CIA pilots took to the air to carry out bombing and strafing missions in support of the rebels. In Washington, Col. Alex Kawilarung, the Indonesian military attachÆ, was persuaded by the Agency to "defect". He soon showed up in Indonesia to take charge of the rebel forces. Yet, as the fighting dragged on into spring, the insurgents proved unable to win decisive victories or take the offensive, although the CIA bombing raids were taking their toll. Sukarno later claimed that on a Sunday morning in April, a plane bombed a ship in the harbor of the island of Ambon -- all those aboard losing their lives -- as well as hitting a church, which demolished the building and killed everyone inside. He stated that 700 casualties had resulted from this single run.
On 15 May, a CIA plane bombed the Ambon marketplace, killing a large number of civilians on their way to church on Ascension Thursday. The Indonesian government had to act to suppress public demonstrations.
Three days later, during another bombing run over Ambon, a CIA pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down and captured. Thirty years old, from Perrine, Florida, Pope had flown 55 night missions over Communist lines in Korea for the Air Force. Later he spent two months flying through Communist flak for the CIA to drop supplies to the French at Dien Bien Phu. Now his luck had run out. He was to spend four years as a prisoner in Indonesia before Sukarno acceded to a request from Robert Kennedy for his release.
Pope was captured carrying a set of incriminating documents, including those which established him as a pilot for the US Air Force and the CIA airline CAT. Like all men flying clandestine missions, Pope had gone through an elaborate procedure before taking off to "sanitize" him, as well as his aircraft. But he had apparently smuggled the papers aboard the plane, for he knew that to be captured as an "anonymous, stateless civilian" meant having virtually no legal rights and running the risk of being shot as a spy in accordance with custom. A captured US military man, however, becomes a commodity of value for his captors while he remains alive.
The lndonesian government derived immediate material concessions from the United States as a result of the incident. Whether the Indonesians thereby agreed to keep silent about Pope is not known, but on 27 May the pilot and his documents were presented to the world at a news conference, thus contradicting several recent statements by high American officials.{20} Notable amongst these was President Eisenhower's declaration on 30 April concerning Indonesia: "Our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through so as not to be taking sides where it is none of our business."{21}
And on 9 May, an editorial in the New York Times had stated:

It is unfortunate that high officials of the Indonesian Government have given further circulation to the false report that the United States Government was sanctioning aid to Indonesia's rebels. The position of the United States Government has been made plain, again and again. Our Secretary of State was emphatic in his declaration that this country would not deviate from a correct neutrality ... the United States is not ready ... to step in to help overthrow a constituted government. Those are the hard facts. Jakarta does not help its case, here, by ignoring them.

With the exposure of Pope and the lack of rebel success in the field, the CIA decided that the light was no longer worth the candle, and began to curtail its support. By the end of June, Indonesian army troops loyal to Sukarno had effectively crushed the dissident military revolt.
The Indonesian leader continued his adroit balancing act between the Communists and the army until 1965, when the latter, likely with the help of the CIA, finally overthrew his regime.

Mỹ đem 'dân chủ, nhân quyền' đến cho dân Iraq?

Chính quyền Mỹ dùng và thay đổi nhiều lý do cho việc tấn công và chiếm đóng Iraq. Mới đầu thì họ dùng lý do là Iraq sở hữu WMD đe dọa trưc tiếp tới an ninh nước Mỹ!, nhưng sau khi tìm hoài không thấy WMD thì họ đổi sang lý do ban bố "tự do, dân chủ, nhân quyền". Nhưng sự thật sau hơn 4 năm người Iraq có mấy thứ đó không?
Vào 16 tháng chín vừa rồi, vệ sĩ thuộc công ty Blackwater nã súng loạn xạ làm chết 17 mạng Iraq tại một quảng trường trong thủ đô Baghdad. Điều tra sau đó của chính quyền Iraq kết luận rằng vụ nổ súng này không phải là phản ứng sau khi bị tấn công. Không tìm ra nhân chứng nào mâu thuẫn với kết luận đó. Những vệ sĩ nước ngoài nổi tiếng là hung hãn và chuyên môn bắn bậy và đây không phải là trường hợp cá biệt.
Điều tra ban đầu của phía Mỹ bởi U.S. Central Command cũng cho rằng "không dính dáng tời hoạt động của kẻ thù". Báo cáo này nói rằng đám vệ sĩ của Blackwater đang di chuyển ngược dòng xe trong một luồng giao thông vòng tròn thì họ nã súng vào 5 xe thường dân ở khoảng cách khoảng 50 yards.
Tại sao các vệ sĩ này lại có thể giết người khi đang ở trong nước người ta một cách "tự do dân chủ" thế? Tại vì họ được một chỉ thị bảo vệ họ không bị truy tố trước pháp luật khi họ giết người Iraq trên đất Iraq! Nhưng ai ban hành chỉ thị đó? Đó là L. Paul Bremer, toàn quyền do Mỹ cử sang giám hộ Iraq tới tháng 6/2004, và có những thông tin cho rằng Bộ Ngoại Giao Mỹ khẳng định sẽ che chở cho những vệ sĩ của Blackwater theo như chỉ thị của Paul Bremer! Nhưng viên chức của Bộ Ngoại Giao Mỹ đã từ chối trả lời vấn đề này khi được hỏi.
Để xác định chủ quyền và xoa dịu phẫn nộ trong dân chúng, chính phủ Iraq đã thông qua dự luật bãi bõ quyền được miễn tố của các công ty an ninh tư nhân nước ngoài, và trình lên quốc hội phê duyệt.
Chúng ta hãy chờ xem, chủ quyền của người Iraq trên đất Iraq có cao hơn chủ quyền của Mỹ trên đất Iraq hay không.
Người Iraq đang sống dưới một xã hội "tự do, dân chủ, dân quyền" do chính Mỹ tạo ra và dày công vun đắp nhưng không những lính Mỹ không chịu trách nhiệm dưới luật pháp Iraq mà ngay cả những công ty tư nhân cũng có quyền đó!
Chúng ta đang sống trong thế kỷ 21, nhưng những kiểu đè đầu cưỡi cổ chà đạp lên cái quyền căn bản nhất của con người là quyền sống của người dân những nước nhược tiểu vẫn xảy ra như trong thời thực dân. Vậy mà chính quyền Mỹ vẫn gân cổ trên chỉ trích nước này nước nọ về chuyện "thiếu nhân quyền"!
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Iraq bill would lift contractor immunity

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071030/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_security_contractors

By SINAN SALAHEDDIN, Associated Press Writer

BAGHDAD - The Iraqi government on Tuesday approved draft legislation lifting immunity for foreign private security companies, sending the measure to parliament, a spokesman said.



The question of immunity has been one of the most serious dispute between the U.S. and the Iraqi government since a Sept. 16 shooting involving Blackwater USA guards that left 17 Iraqi civilians dead.
The government's decision followed reports that the State Department has promised Blackwater bodyguards immunity from prosecution in its investigation of last month's shooting.
State Department officials declined to confirm or deny that immunity had been granted. Blackwater spokeswoman Anne Tyrrell has declined comment about the U.S. investigation.
Iraqi government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said the draft law approved Tuesday would overturn an immunity order known as Decree 17 that was issued by L. Paul Bremer, who ran the American occupation government until June 2004.
"It will be sent to the parliament within the coming days to be ratified," he told The Associated Press.
Al-Dabbagh did not single out Blackwater but said: "According to this law, all security companies will subjected to the Iraqi criminal law and must obey all the country's legal regulations such as: registration, customs, visas, etcetera."
U.S. Embassy spokeswoman Mirembe Nantongo said she had not seen the measure and had no immediate comment. The embassy has said it was waiting for the results of investigations.
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has promised to push through the measure amid growing public anger over the Blackwater shootings in Baghdad and a series of other Iraqi civilian deaths allegedly at the hands of foreign contractors.
Three senior U.S. law enforcement officials told The Associated Press that all the Blackwater bodyguards involved — both in the vehicle convoy and in at least two helicopters above — were given the legal protection as investigators from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security sought to find out what happened. The bureau is an arm of the State Department.
The law enforcement and State Department officials agreed to speak only if they could remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the inquiry into the incident.
The Moyock, N.C.-based company, which is the largest private security firm protecting U.S. diplomats in Iraq, has said its Sept. 16 convoy was under attack before it opened fire in west Baghdad's Nisoor Square, killing 17 Iraqis. A follow-up investigation by the Iraqi government, however, concluded that Blackwater's men were unprovoked. No witnesses have been found to contradict that finding.
An initial incident report by U.S. Central Command, which oversees military operations in Iraq, also indicated "no enemy activity involved" in the Sept. 16 incident. The report says Blackwater guards were traveling against the flow of traffic through a traffic circle when they "engaged five civilian vehicles with small arms fire" at a distance of 50 yards.
The FBI took over the case early this month, officials said, after prosecutors in the Justice Department's criminal division realized it could not bring charges against Blackwater guards based on their statements to the Diplomatic Security investigators.
Blackwater's contract with the State Department expires in May and there are questions whether it will remain as the primary contractor for diplomatic bodyguards.
Congress also is expected to investigate the shootings, but a House watchdog committee said it has so far held off, based on a Justice Department request that lawmakers wait until the FBI concludes its inquiry.
___
Associated Press writer Lara Jakes Jordan in Washington contributed to this report.

UN: Try or release enemy combatants

Vài bữa trước, Mỹ cử cả một phái đoàn sang VN để xem ở VN có "tự do tôn giáo" không! Đó thật là một hành động lố bịch. Trong khi Ủy Ban Nhân Quyền của LHQ không có phàn nàn gì vế tình hình tự do tôn giáo ở VN, thì Mỹ lại tỏ ra rất quan tâm về điều này. Một lòng tốt thật lạ lùng đến nỗi làm người ta phải nghi ngờ!

Chân mình thì lấm mê mê

Tay cầm bó đuốc mà rê chân người!

Chính quyền Mỹ giành hết thời gian để lo sợ một vài người nào đó ở VN và vài ngóc ngách xa xôi nào đó trên thế giới không có nhân quyền mà quên bẵng hàng ngàn người bị họ giam cầm như thú vật mà không bị buộc tội và xét xử ở nhiều nơi trên thế giới.

Một điều tra viên của LHQ về nhân quyền đã thăm trại tù Guantanamo và kêu gọi chính quyền Mỹ hãy xử tội hoặc tha bổng những người tù ở đây.

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UN: Try or release enemy combatants

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071030/ap_on_re_us/un_us_rights

By EDITH M. LEDERER, Associated Press Writer Mon Oct 29, 11:35 PM ET

UNITED NATIONS - A U.N. human rights expert is calling on the United States to prosecute or release suspects detained as "unlawful enemy combatants" and to move quickly to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp.

Martin Scheinin, the U.N.'s independent investigator on human rights in the fight against terrorism, said in a report released Monday that he's concerned about U.S. detention practices, military courts and interrogation techniques.

He urged the U.S. government to end the CIA practice of extraordinary rendition, in which terrorism suspects are taken to foreign countries for interrogation.

Scheinin said he was also concerned about what he termed "enhanced interrogation techniques reportedly used by the CIA," saying that under international law "there are no circumstances in which cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment may be justified."

The U.S. military defended the current process. "Unlawful enemy combatants held at Guantanamo are afforded more due process than any other captured enemy fighters in the history of warfare," U.S. Navy Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon, a Defense Department spokesman on Guantanamo, told The Associated Press. "We will enforce the law as spelled out in the Military Commissions Act of 2006."

Gordon, who said appropriate officials will review the report, added that the U.S. will move cautiously on Guantanamo.

"While we have stated our desires to close Guantanamo, it would be irresponsible to release these dangerous men into the general population," he said.

Scheinin, a law professor from Finland appointed by the Geneva-based U.N. Human Rights Council, issued a preliminary report after visiting the United States in May. His final report was issued on Monday, coinciding with the report to the U.N. General Assembly's human rights committee.

Scheinin expressed regret to the committee that he couldn't interview detainees at Guantanamo in private.

Scheinin also welcomed his recent invitation by the U.S. government to Guantanamo to observe proceedings before military commissions.

In the report, Scheinin called for the abolition of the military commissions which were established in 2001 by President and declared unlawful by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006 because they were not authorized by Congress. Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006.

Scheinin said the offenses in the 2006 law — including terrorism, wrongfully aiding the enemy, spying and conspiracy — "go beyond offenses under the laws of war." He argued that the offense did not apply at the time of the alleged acts by detainees, and maintained that the commissions are applying criminal law retroactively in violation of international law.

Due to various concerns, Scheinin recommended the abolition of the commissions. "Wherever possible, ordinary civilian courts should be used to try terrorist suspects," he said.

Scheinin also recommended that the U.S. government abandon "the categorization of persons as `unlawful enemy combatants,'" calling it a "a term of convenience without legal effect."

The report called on the "United States to release or to put on trial those persons detained under that categorization."

While acknowledging the need to bring those accused of war crimes to justice, Scheinin emphasized that "the chance of ensuring a fair trial diminishes over time." He added that "the detention of persons for a period of several years without charge fundamentally undermines the right of fair trial."

Scheinin called on the U.S. to lift restrictions that prohibit Guantanamo Bay detainees to seek "full judicial review of their combatant status." The U.S. prohibition violates the International Covenant's prohibitions on arbitrary detention, the right to a judicial review which could grant freedom, and the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, he said.

He urged "determined action" to move toward Bush's goal of closing Guantanamo.

Scheinin said he has been advised that up to 80 detainees will be tried by military commissions, and that the U.S. wants to return the rest to their countries of origin or to a third country. He said the U.S. and the U.N. should work together to resettle detainees in accord with international law.

Người bạn láng giềng và những khúc quanh lịch sử tương đồng

Lịch sử cận đại thời trước và sau Thế Chiến II của Indonesia có nhiều điểm tương đồng với VN. Indonesia là thuộc địa của Hà Lan. Thực dân Hà Lan chiếm Indonesia cũng là để hút máu làm giàu cho 'mẫu quốc'. Họ cũng coi người Indo là mọi rợ, hầu hết người Indo cũng là làm lao công và rất ít người vươn tới được tầng lớp trung lưu. Trong thời gian Thế Chiến II, Nhật cũng nhảy vào chiếm Indonesia và dùng tài nguyên của nước này phục vụ bộ cho máy chiến tranh của Nhật.

Nh

ững nhân vật lãnh đạo giành độc lập cho Indonesia cũng là những người trong số ít trí thức của nước này và cũng từng là tù chính trị dưới thời thực dân Hà Lan, Sukarno và Mohammad Hatta.

Sau khi Nhật thua quân

Đồng Minh. Sukarno và Hatta cũng tự lên nắm chính quyền. Khi quân Anh vào "giải phóng" quần đảo này, họ cũng đã gặp phải một chính quyền của người Indo đang hoạt động rồi. Người Anh cũng cho rằng Indonesia là thuộc địa của Hà Lan và hứa hẹn sẽ hoàn trả đất đó cho người Hà Lan!

Sau khi Anh rút quân, Hà Lan

đem 91,000 quân vào Indonesia trở lại. Và sự trở lại của đó cũng đã châm ngòi cho một cuộc cách mạnh toàn diện chống lại người Hà Lan. Cũng giống như trường hợp VN, Mỹ coi như không có sự hiện diện của chính quyền người bản xứ, hoàn toàn ủng hộ cố gắng chiếm lại thuộc địa của thực dân Châu Âu. Họ cũng ngụy biện cho hành động phản dân chủ đó bằng lý do chống cộng, bất chấp thực tế là Đảng Cộng sản Indonesia, PKI, là một đảng yếu nhất trong các đảng phái ở Indonesia lúc bấy giờ. Và với kiểu nói ngược đó, Mỹ cũng đã giúp đỡ trang bị quân sự cho người Hà Lan.

Nhưng khác với VN, cuối cùng dưới sự can thiệp của LHQ, quân Hà Lan đã rút về nhưng đổi lại Indonesia phải chịu chấp nhận một món nợ khổng lồ với Hà Lan.

Tổng thống Sukarno là người theo chủ nghĩa dân tộc, ông ta cũng giống như Chủ tịch HCM muốn giao hảo với tất cả các đại cường, nhưng làm như vậy không thể thỏa mãn được tham vọng bá chủ của Mỹ nên chính phủ Mỹ không ủng hộ ông ta mà tìm cách bắt tay với các tướng trong quân đội Indonesia để lật đổ ông.

CIA sau đó tiến hành những hoạt động bí mật hỗ trợ vũ khí phương tiện cho một nhóm tướng lãnh thực hiện đảo chính quân sự vào 1958. Họ giúp cả B-26 và B-29 (kiểu máy bay từng dùng thả bom nguyên tử ở Nhật) cho những vụ ném bom vào những thành phố và tàu chiến của Indonesia. Nhưng cố gắng lật đổ này cuối cùng cũng bị thất bại.

Lực lượng phản loạn sau đó vẫn tiếp tục chiến đấu thêm ba năm nữa và làm thiệt mạng hàng trăm ngàn người nữa. Và để đối phó tình trạng bất ổn đó, ông Sukarno đã phải xiết chặt kiểm soát, cho hành pháp nhiều quyền lực hơn, giải tán quốc hội, Cuối cùng kết quả là hoàn toàn ngược lại với mục đích mà Tổng thống Mỹ lúc đó là Eisenhower mong muốn. Ông ta muốn lật đổ Sukarno nhưng chẳng những đã không làm được chuyện đó mà ngược lại Sukarno và Đảng CS Indo, PKI, lại càng mạnh thêm. Và cũng giống như ở VN, sự can thiệp thô bạo và tham vọng của Mỹ muốn kiểm soát nắm đầu một nước yếu đã khiến giới lãnh đạo của những nuớc này không có lựa chọn nào khác hơn là thiết lập một chế độ toàn trị.

Bài dưới đây lấy từ một trang của khoa Lịch Sử trường Đại Học Houston, Texas, Mỹ

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http://vi.uh.edu/pages/buzzmat/kahin3.htm

Brian Behnken

Audrey and George Kahin’s Subversion as Foreign Policy documents the changing nature of US foreign policy in the late 1950s from that of ambassadorial diplomatic relations to the use of the Central Intelligence Agency as a tool for international diplomacy. The book chronicles the end of World War II as witnessed by Indonesia, and how this country dealt with its subsequent freedom. The book is aptly titled, for what it seeks to explain, in part, revolves around the way the CIA ignored or subverted normal diplomatic channels in Indonesia in favor of covert operations. As most historians now understand, the CIA increasingly used covert ops in the late 1940s and on through the 1980s as a distinct methodology for the gaining of diplomatic goals. Covert ops themselves became diplomacy, and foreign policy was often dictated by how covert operations played out. Of course, as most now know, these operations often produced lasting problems in the countries in which they were performed. This is the case with Indonesia.

Before the US ever remotely considered involving itself in the affairs of Indonesia, the island group worked hard to overcome certain deficits that remained from colonialism. Indonesia, a Dutch colony, suffered from the pervasive racist attitudes of the time and the Dutch viewed the Indonesians as backwards, ignorant, and barbaric. Almost all Indonesians performed some form of manual labor and very few middle class Indonesians existed. During WWII, Japan began landing forces on various Indonesian islands, and the Indonesian people rejoiced. Even though the Japanese elevated the conditions of most Indonesians by training them for the armed forces, giving them public education and assistance, and forcing the Dutch to a powerless standstill, in the end the Japanese were disliked as much as the Dutch. Indonesia suffered as Japan began to lose the war. Japan pressured the island group for more and more raw goods to feed the Japanese war machine. After the war, with the Japanese basically ousted from the country and only a small contingent of Dutch people and troops remaining, Sukarno announced Indonesian independence. Sukarno had been a political prisoner during Dutch rule and was released by the Japanese. One of the few well-educated Indonesians, Sukarno soon took a prominent role in the country’s affairs. The next most prominent citizen, Mohammad Hatta, was also a political prisoner released by the Japanese. The two leaders worked with Japan under the belief that Indonesia would one-day be granted independence.

The Japanese forces remained firmly entrenched in Indonesia when Japan surrendered to the allies. The US seemingly had bigger fish to fry at the time and worried little over Indonesia’s fate. A Communist threat in Europe and the concluding peace talks were far more important than a group of islands in the middle of nowhere. The Japanese had little control over Indonesian actions at this time and without their assistance Sukarno and Hatta led the country. When British forces arrived to “liberate” the island, they found an already functional Indonesian government. The British, however, saw the country as a Dutch colony and made assurances to the Dutch that they would return the colony. When the Indonesians fought back, the British realized that they were out of place. When the British pulled out, 91,000 Dutch troops arrived to replace them. The arrival of the Dutch troops signaled the start of a full-fledged revolution. Ignoring the fact that a new, albeit rudimentary, Indonesian government already existed, the US greatly supported the Dutch efforts. Fearing that Indonesia might be overrun with Communists, the US provided the Dutch with great amounts of military equipment. Indonesia was hardly a bastion of Communism, however. Most of the country’s political parties had mildly socialist views and the PKI, the only communist party, always finished dead last in the polls. Nevertheless the US feared a Communist takeover of the islands. Finally, the UN halted the Dutch activities and in a striking move saddled Indonesia with a huge debt to the Netherlands in exchange for the withdrawal of Dutch troops.

Indonesia won the revolution, but at huge costs. The US reversed its position and supported Indonesia towards the end of the revolution, but the aid was minimal both during and after the war. Sukarno seems to have trusted the US little more than any of the previous countries that had dealings in the island chain. It is no wonder that with the intermixing of affairs with the Dutch, Japanese, and British, Sukarno and Hatta called for national unity. Sukarno, however, wanted the PKI included in this unity. Hatta resigned in protest, although he would continue to play a substantial role in the country’s political affairs for years to come. Sukarno’s call went unheeded by the Indonesian people, however. The army remained in a deplorable state after the war, the parliament disagreed with Sukarno often, and the country suffered from religious strife between Christians and Moslems. Also, Sukarno continually tried to get the island of West Irian (still Dutch) back into the sphere of Indonesia’s influence. All of these internal factors culminated in a revolt of several military colonels.

The “rebellion” of the four colonels soon aroused further US attention. Suddenly the island group did not seem so far away and the threat of Communism loomed large. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (Secretary of State) became further concerned when in 1957 Sukarno rejected US-style democracy. He also made trips to China and the USSR, further exciting the US. Also, the PKI had steadily grown in influence because the party supported Sukarno’s claim to West Irian. To top it all off, after years of requesting substantial US military aid to no avail, Sukarno appealed to Soviet bloc countries for aid and received it. This was too much for Eisenhower, the ambassadors in Indonesia, and the Dulles brothers. Allen Dulles viewed Indonesia as spinning out of control and wanted to begin a covert operation to replace Sukarno. While officials at the State Department disagreed with Allen Dulles, the strength of the Dulles brothers in the eyes of Eisenhower allowed their view to become gospel. When the four dissident colonels appealed to the US for military aid, the CIA slowly began supplying the rebels with US personnel for training Indonesian soldiers. The US ambassador to Indonesia never received this information. Eisenhower’s reluctance to begin a full covert operation in the country ended when Sukarno seized all remaining Dutch properties in Indonesia as a result of failed negotiations for West Irian. He also repudiated the huge debt owed to the Dutch. The US saw that Sukarno had clearly been subverted by Communist forces.

Thereafter, shipments of arms began secretly arriving in the rebel colonels home bases at regular intervals. US diplomats in Indonesia also had no knowledge of this occurrence. Sukarno became aware of this aid and announced that Indonesia would henceforth have a twelve mile territorial boundary instead of a three mile boundary. This further angered leadership in Washington and Eisenhower ordered the US 7^th Fleet to Indonesia with the purpose of protecting American interests. The rebels soon began bombing Indonesian cities and military vessels using American B-26 and B-29 aircraft. On the ground, however, the forces of the Indonesian government under the command of General Nasution carried the day. In response to the crushing defeats suffered at the hands of the government forces, the rebels retreated and announced the formation of a counter-government in Indonesia. Sukarno responded by bombing rebel strongholds. Much of the rebel airforce, the only real advantage the rebels had over the government, met with destruction in the bombing runs. When it became obvious that the rebels were losing , the US decided to distance itself from the mess that it partially created. The US still desired to oust Sukarno, however, and they began concentrating their efforts on anticommunist elements through Nasution. Nasution, however, was loyal to Sukarno and refused US entreaties. Finally, the US reversed course and began to directly aid Sukarno.

The rebellion, however, lasted another three years and cost hundreds of thousands of lives. The US so bolstered the rebels with supplies that they were able to slip into the jungle after their most crushing defeats and continue a guerrilla war. As a result of all of the fighting, Sukarno began tightening his overall control over the country. He strengthened the executive branch, dismissed the parliament, and returned to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 to give himself further authority. Finally the rebels surrendered in 1961, but the country’s problems were still far from over. Eisenhower’s goals had exactly the opposite effect than he had intended. Instead of ousting Sukarno, Ike made him stronger. Instead of destroying the Communists in Indonesia, the Communists grew as they continued to support Sukarno. The army controlled almost all aspects of the country, the country became authoritarian instead of democratic, and representative government came to an end. When Suharto overthrew Sukarno, a dictatorship had already been created and a true dictator took power. Due to US involvement the country had a tremendous supply of weapons, and Suharto had a fear of Communists. In purges not unlike those seen in the USSR, Suharto had thousands of communists killed. American weapons made this job much easier for him.

The Kahin’s call the US involvement in Indonesia “a debacle.” Truly, the efforts of the US in this clusterfuck were deplorable and counterproductive. Events turned out exactly the opposite of how the US expected they would. Of course, at this time the US also had dealings with supposed Communist threats in Iran and Guatemala, as well as in the US itself thanks to McCarthy. It seems that the Dulleses and Ike created a mindset preferable to seeing Communist activities almost everywhere. Had this country’s leaders not seen red so often, perhaps things might have turned out differently. The Kahin’s main point, that the US subverted diplomatic channels, is perhaps the most poignant. Had Eisenhower chosen to negotiate or at least communicate through diplomatic channels, this whole mess might have been avoided. The Kahin’s do an excellent job of examining all issues surrounding these events. One could only hope for improvement in a few small areas, for instance; the reason why the US was so interested in such a small country, the overall economic value of Indonesia, and the inclusion of information examining the US role in Indonesia after the rebellion. Suharto’s legacy is, of course, another book altogether, but some small introspection by the authors to explain the US’s continued support of such a dictator would seem to be in order.

Putin lại nói sự thật

Trong cuộc đối thoại hàng năm với nhân dân Nga trên đài tuyền hình ngày 18/10/2007, Tổng thống Nga V. Putin nói rằng cuộc chiến tranh của Mỹ với người Iraq là 'vô nghĩa' và một phần là nhắm vào nguồn dự trữ dầu mỏ của nước này.

Một người thợ cơ khí ở thành phố Novosibirsk thuộc vùng Siberia hỏi Putin rằng ông có ý kiến gì về lời phát biểu của cựu ngoại trưởng Mỹ Madeleine Albright (thời Clinton) vài năm về trước cho rằng vùng Siberia có quá nhiều tài nguyên tự nhiên nên không thể chỉ thuộc quyền sở hữu của một nước được.

Putin trả lời: "Tôi biết rằng có vài chính trị gia chơi với những ý đồ như vậy trong đầu họ," ông ta gọi đó là "dục vọng chính trị mà ... khó dẫn đến một kết cục tích cực", và thêm rằng:

"Ví dụ tốt nhất của kết luận trên là những sự kiện xảy ra ở Iraq - một nước nhỏ không có khả năng tự bảo vệ nhưng lại sở hữu một trữ lượng dầu hỏa khổng lồ. Và chúng ta đã chứng kiến những điều đã xảy ra. Mỹ học được cách bắn súng ở đó, nhưng họ đã không thể thiết lập được trật tự."

"Có thể xóa bỏ một vài chế độ bạo ngược nào đó khỏi bản đồ chính trị ... nhưng tuyệt đối là vô nghĩa khi đánh nhau với một dân tộc. Cảm ơn trời, nước Nga không phải là Iraq. Chúng ta có đủ sức mạnh để tự bảo vệ chúng ta và quyền lợi của chúng ta, cả trên lãnh thổ của chúng ta và ở những vùng miền khác trên thế giới."

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Putin Slams U.S. For "Pointless" Iraq War

Says America Fighting Iraqis To Control Oil Reserves, New Warning On Missile Defense

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/18/world/main3379994.shtml

MOSCOW, Oct. 18, 2007

(AP) President Vladimir Putin, in his latest jab at Washington, suggested Thursday that the U.S. military campaign in Iraq was a "pointless" battle against the Iraqi people, aimed in part at seizing the country's oil reserves.

Russian President Vladimir Putin listens to a

question at the Kremlin in Moscow, Oct. 18, 2007.

(AP Photo/RIA Novosti)

Putin has increasingly confronted U.S. foreign policy in recent months, deepening the chill between Washington and Moscow. Among other things, he has questioned U.S. plans for a missile defense system in Europe and the U.S. push for sanctions against Iran for its nuclear programs.

Putin spoke during an annual question-and-answer session with the public. Broadcast live on state-controlled TV channels and radio stations, the event consisted of people from around the country quizzing Putin on issues such as pensions, public workers' salaries and school funding.

In one question, a mechanic from the Siberian city of Novosibirsk asked the president about comments he said were made some years ago by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who suggested that Siberia had too many natural resources to belong to one country.

"I know that some politicians play with such ideas in their heads," he said, dismissing the notion as wishful thinking, or "political erotica that ... hardly leads to a positive result."

"The best example of that are the events in Iraq - a small country that can hardly defend itself and which possesses huge oil reserves. And we see what's going on there. They've learned to shoot there, but they are not managing to bring order," he said.

"One can wipe off a political map some tyrannical regime ... but it's absolutely pointless to fight with a people," he said. "Russia, thank God, isn't Iraq. It has enough strength and power to defend itself and its interests, both on its territory and in other parts of the world."

Putin suggested the U.S. campaign was aimed at seizing control of Iraq's vast oil wealth, and said a concrete date must be set for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

"I believe one of the goals is to establish control of the country's oil reserves," he said.

Unless a date for pulling out is set, Putin said, "the Iraqi leadership, feeling (safe) under the reliable American umbrella, will not hurry to develop its own armed and law enforcement forces."

Putin also reiterated his warning against U.S. efforts to put elements of a missile defense system in eastern Europe.

He said U.S. officials were genuinely considering Russian proposals to resolve the dispute. He added, however, "If a decision is made without taking Russia's opinion into account, then we will certainly take steps in response, to ensure the security of Russian citizens."

He did not elaborate on what steps Russia would take.

During the phone-in session, Putin also discussed his recent trip to Iran, which is under increasing Western pressure and scrutiny over its nuclear program.

"Russia is taking steps together with other members of the international negotiations to solve the problem through peaceful means in the interests of the international community and the Iranian people," Putin said.

One can wipe off a political map some tyrannical regime... but it's absolutely pointless to fight with a people.

Russian President Vladimir Putin

Threats against Iran, he said, are "harmful for international relations because dialogue with states ... is always more promising. It is a shorter route toward success than a policy of threats, sanctions and, even less so, armed pressure."

Putin, who is widely popular among Russians for the stability and relative prosperity of the country during his regime, has sought to use phone-ins along with tightly choreographed, lavish television coverage to project the image of a leader responding directly to voters' concerns.

He said Thursday that Russia will have a different president next year, reaffirming his plans to step aside but leaving unclear what exact role he might have.

With just two months remaining before crucial parliamentary elections - and five before presidential elections - speculation has mounted about Putin's plans once his second, consecutive term ends in March.

"In 2008, in the Kremlin there will be a different person," Putin said. He also said he expected no radical policy changes from his successor, adding that the next president should "keep the stable course of our nation and continuity in realizing the plans that have been devised in recent years."

Putin thẳng thắn

Putin nổi tiếng là một nhà lãnh đạo nói chuyện thẳng thắn, không e dè, kiêng nể đối với phương tây và Mỹ và tôi rất thích điều này ở ông ta vì tôi thích lời nói trực tiếp vào thực tế, không quanh co. Trong phát biểu gần đây nhất về vấn đề Mỹ cấm vận Iran lần thứ ba, ông ta nói: "Tại sao phải làm xấu thêm tình hình bằng những đe dọa cấm vận và đưa cuộc đối thoại đến một ngõ cụt? Cách tốt nhất để giải quyết mâu thuẫn không phải là chạy vòng vòng như một tên điên với một lưỡi dao cạo trong tay." Lại một lần nữa Putin "hit the nail on the head"!

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New sanctions levied against Iran

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071025/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_iran

By ANNE GEARAN, AP Diplomatic Writer

WASHINGTON - The United States announced harsh new penalties on the Iranian military and state-owned banking systems Thursday, raising pressure on the world financial system to cut ties with a regime the West accuses of bankrolling terrorism and seeking a nuclear bomb.

The U.S. sanctions on elements of Iran's vast armed forces and its largest bank are the most sweeping since 1979, when the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran ruptured diplomatic, business and military ties.

The sanctions are the first of their type imposed by the United States specifically against the armed forces of another government. They are part of the Bush administration's two-track approach to its chief adversary in the Mideast that offsets diplomatic overtures with sanctions, bellicose rhetoric and the implicit threat of military action.

U.S. officials insisted Thursday that the new moves do not hasten war and that the United States remains committed to finding a way to talk Iran out of a nuclear program the U.S. claims is hostile.

The punitive moves directly target Iranian organizations and people the U.S. accuses of supporting terrorism or spreading weapons of mass destruction, but the main effect is likely to fall elsewhere — on European and other overseas banks and firms that do business with oil-rich Iran.

"As awareness of Iran's deceptive behavior has grown, many banks around the world have decided as a matter of prudence and integrity that Iran's business is simply not worth the risk," Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said.

There has been grumbling, mainly in Europe, about earlier U.S. financial sanctions on Iran that overseas bankers found heavy-handed, but Paulson is right that some of Iran's former financial partners have already distanced themselves from Tehran under hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Paulson and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the penalties together, a recognition that a year-old effort to levy unilateral Treasury sanctions has had far greater effect than the diplomatic channels Rice has pursued with Iran.

"Unfortunately the Iranian government continues to spurn our offer of open negotiations, instead threatening peace and security," through its nuclear program, export of ballistic missiles, Rice said, along with what she charged is backing for militants in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

The latest sanctions will cut off more than 20 Iranian entities, including individuals and companies owned or controlled by the powerful Revolutionary Guard Corps, from the American financial system.

State-owned Bank Melli, Bank Mellat and Bank Saderat were named supporters of global terrorist groups for their activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East.

Any assets found in the United States belonging to the designated groups must be frozen. Americans are also forbidden from doing business with those designated organizations.

Bank Melli is Iran's largest. The United States says it provides services to Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Bank Mellat serves the state Atomic Energy Organization and Bank Saderat routs money to terrorist or militant groups, the administration said.

The administration did not lay out any new evidence for the allegations.

The penalties, some of which have been long expected, were announced an hour before Rice faced scathing questions from congressional Democrats on Iraq, and in the midst of embarrassing revelations about lapses in the State Department's management of private security guards in Iraq.

The designations put companies outside the United States on notice that doing business with the designated groups could put them at risk of U.S. financial penalty.

The United States has the world's largest economy and the most influential banking system, and much of the world's business is done in dollars.

Paulson said it is nearly impossible for overseas businesses or banks to "know one's customer" in Iran and avoid unwittingly funding terrorism or other illicit activities.

Iran's Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics were designated proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.

The Revolutionary Guards is the largest component of Iran's military and has influence in business and other spheres. The defense ministry entity is the parent organization for Iran's aerospace and ballistic missile operations.

The Quds Force, which was named a supporter of designated terrorist organizations, is a part of the Guard Corps that Washington accuses of providing weapons, including powerful explosives blamed for the deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

In Iran, the Guards' chief shrugged off the U.S. pressure.

"They have applied all their efforts to reduce the efficiency of this revolutionary body," General Mohammad Ali Jafari said, according to the state news agency IRNA. "Now as always, the corps is ready to defend the ideals of the revolution more than ever before."

The United States has long labeled Iran a state supporter of terrorism and has been working for years to gain support for tougher global sanctions aimed at keeping the country from developing nuclear weapons.

The Bush administration has won two rounds of watered-down U.N. Security Council sanctions but has been frustrated by months of delay in seeking a third, tougher set of penalties.

Iran has ignored the U.N. sanctions and an offer from European nations that do extensive business with Iran would give the oil-rich country economic and other incentives in exchange for dropping nuclear activities that could produce a bomb.

Iran is continuing work on its nuclear program, which it says is peaceful.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin warned Thursday against new international sanctions on Iran, saying they would lead to a dead end.

"Why worsen the situation by threatening sanctions and bring it to a dead end?" Putin said, referring to the U.S. push for the third set of penalties. "It's not the best way to resolve the situation by running around like a madman with a razor blade in his hand."

Russia and China, which hold veto power at the U.N. Security Council, are allies or business partners of Iran and are the chief holdup for the new sanctions sought by the United States.

___

Associated Press Writers Matthew Lee and Jeannine Aversa contributed to this report.